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Should parents be allowed to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis to choose the sexual
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Extending the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to screen embryos for non-medical traits such
as gender, height and intelligence, raises serious moral, legal, and social issues. In this paper I consider the possibil-
ity of using PGD to select the sexual orientation of offspring. After considering ®ve potential objections, I conclude
that parents should be permitted to use PGD to choose the sexual orientation of their children.
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In his article `Ethical issues in new uses of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis', Robertson (2003) analyses the moral, legal,
and social implications of extending the application of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Evidently, the most
challenging ethical issues are posed by the prospect of using
PGD to screen embryos for non-medical traits such as gender,
height and intelligence. In this paper I wish to focus on the
possibility of using PGD to select the sexual orientation of
offspring: If a safe and reliable genetic test were ever to
become available, should parents be allowed to use PGD to
choose the sexual orientation of their children?
Utilizing PGD to select the sexual orientation of offspring
will presumably be subject to at least ®ve objections. The ®rst
objection that can be raised might be as follows: PGD is a
medical procedure designed to detect genetic disorders. Since
homosexuality is not a disease, PGD should not be employed to
ensure the birth of heterosexual children. This is a familiar
objection in debates over PGD. However, as familiar as it may
be, it is certainly not a persuasive one. We have already
become accustomed to a medical system in which physicians
often provide services that have no direct medical bene®t but
that do have great personal value for the individuals seeking it.
Given the acceptance of breast enlargement, hair replacement,
ultrasound assisted lipo-suction and other forms of cosmetic
surgery, one cannot, without calling that system into question,
condemn a practice merely because it uses a medical procedure
for lifestyle or child-rearing choices.
A second objection could claim that a state permitting the
use of PGD to ensure a heterosexual orientation in one's
children would be open to the charge of discrimination against
its homosexual citizens. But this claim is simply untenable.
Granting its citizens a right to use PGD to ensure the birth of
heterosexual children is not the same as placing them under a
duty to use PGD to ensure the birth of heterosexual children.
Only a state coercing its citizens into using PGD to prevent
homosexual offspring would be open to the charge of
discrimination.
A third objection might assert that, even though it would not
be discrimination on the part of the state, it would certainly be
discrimination on the part of the prospective parents if they
were to use PGD to prevent the birth of homosexual children.
This argument is similarly misguided, though. Preferring a
heterosexual over a homosexual child does not in itself in any
way betray a negative judgement about the value of gay and
lesbian individuals. Admittedly, some parents would certainly
seek PGD to ensure the birth of heterosexual children because
they are bigots anxiously adhering to the old clicheÂ that
homosexuality is a `disease', a `perversion' or a `sin'. Still,
most parents using PGD to select the sexual orientation of their
offspring would probably do so simply because they wish to
see their children getting married, building a family and having
children of their own. And the desire to have children who
share the same sexual orientation as oneself is certainly not a
morally objectionable interest.
A fourth objection may be that using PGD to ensure the birth
of heterosexual children will impede the cause of the Gay and
Lesbian Rights Movement as it is likely to lead to a gradual
decline of the homosexual population. More precisely, it could
be argued that a decrease in the number of gay and lesbian
persons will inevitably cause a decrease in the public support
for gay and lesbian people. This is of course a factual claim for
which empirical data must be marshalled. Given the burdens
and expenses of the procedure, it is very unlikely that PGD will
ever considerably reduce the number of homosexual individ-
uals. More importantly, reducing the number of gays and
lesbians does not necessarily imply a reduced concern for the
cause of homosexual people, as is evidenced by the case of
disabled persons. Although the number of people born with
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disabilities has decreased, the support for people with disabil-
ities has increased. Hence, it is far from being obvious that
using PGD to ensure the birth of heterosexual offspring would
inevitably worsen the situation of homosexual people.
A ®fth objection might point to the fact that PGD generally
implies discarding embryos. Thus, it could be argued that the
desire to choose the sexual orientation of one's children does
not justify the deliberate creation and destruction of human
embryos. Whether or not this objection is viable entirely
depends on the moral status accorded to embryos. Since this is
not the place to review all the arguments for and against the
`sanctity of human life', I restrict myself to saying that I doubt
that there are sound reasons for granting embryos individual
rights. The purpose of individual rights is the moral and legal
protection of fundamental interests. Since embryos are too
rudimentary in development to have interests there is simply no
basis to grant them rights. If at all, embryos might be seen as
having some `symbolic value' preventing them from being
destroyed for any purpose whatsoever. Since the desire to have
children of a particular sexual orientation is a morally
legitimate reason, creating and destroying embryos of the
undesired sexual orientation would certainly be justi®ed.
Since none of the potential objections stated are valid,
parents should clearly be allowed to use PGD to choose the
sexual orientation of their children. However, if couples are to
be permitted to choose the sexual orientation of their offspring,
they should not only be allowed to ensure the birth of
heterosexual children but also to ensure the birth of homosex-
ual children.
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